comment will examine whether collateral attacks should be allowed under the current statute, section 1326 of Title 8 of the United States Code. 3 After examining the legislative history and due process considerations, it concludes that collateral attacks should be allowed only if the alien was unrepresented by counsel at the deportation hearing and should succeed only if there was a denial of fundamental fairness at that proceeding.
I. CASE LAW
The federal courts have taken various positions on whether and under what circumstances to allow collateral attacks on deportation orders in section 1326 proceedings. A brief summary of the decisions will show that none of them offers a fully satisfactory treatment of the issue.
The continuing lack of agreement among the courts can be traced to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Spector 4 to leave the issue unresolved. The Court stated that if the parties had raised and briefed the issue, it might have considered whether the statutory preclusion of collateral attacks rendered the statute unconstitutional. 5 In a strong dissent, Justice Jackson argued that it was improper to make a deportation order unreviewable.' He saw particular unfairness in exempting deportation hear-ings from the strict due process requirements of criminal prosecutions by maintaining "with increasing logical difficulty" that deportation is a civil matter, while allowing the Government to "turn around and use the result as a conclusive determination of [deportability] in a criminal proceeding." 8 He warned of the danger to citizens as well as to aliens in creating crimes with nontraversable elements.'
Only the Third Circuit has allowed an inquiry into the evidentiary basis of an order. In United States v. Bowles,'° the court held that a deportation order may be attacked "on at least two fundamental and limited grounds." 1 ' The first ground is that there is no "basis in fact" for the deportation order. If the Government can show factual support, the order becomes conclusive. 12 The second ground is that there is no "warrant in law" for the issuance of the order, by which the court apparently meant misconstruction of law during the initial determination of deportability.1' The court based its permissive stance toward collateral attacks on its interpretation * Id. at 178 (Jackson, J., dissenting). * Id. at 179 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 177 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 10 331 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1964) . " Id. at 750 (footnote omitted).
"Id. The court cited Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442, 453 (1947) (plurality opinion of Reed, J.). That case seemed to equate "basis in fact" with "any substantial basis." If the Bowles court meant "any substantial basis," a collateral attack could inquire deeply into the substantive merits of the deportation order as well as the procedures surrounding it.
A district court has interpreted Bowles to include denials of procedural due process at the hearing as grounds for challenges. United States v. Floulis, 457 F. Supp. 1350 , 1357 (W.D. Pa. 1978 . This probably was contemplated by the court in Bowles, given the decision in McLeod v. Peterson, 283 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1960) . That case held that an alien subject to a second deportation for illegal reentry, see note 2 supra, could challenge the procedures of the prior proceeding. The Floulis court otherwise seemed to narrow the grounds for challenges, holding that a defendant could collaterally attack a prior deportation order only if he could show that there was a gross miscarriage of justice in the hearing. 457 F. Supp. at 1354. The court said:
[W]e hold that the Defendant may collaterally attack his deportation . . . only on grounds which go to the merits of the alien's deportability and on some procedural grounds which are related to the conduct of a full and fair hearing on the merits (i. e. the right to examine all evidence) but may not collaterally attack his deportation on procedural grounds which relate to events occurring after the deportation hearing (i. e. applications for extension of voluntary departure) and which have no bearing on the conduct of a fundamentally fair hearing on the merits of whether the alien is deportable. Id. at 1357.
Is 331 F.2d at 750. As an illustration of the second ground for an attack, the court referred to the issue of whether Bowles had "entered" the country for purposes of the statute.
of the statute:
Back of a deportation lies the deportation warrant and back of the deportation warrant lies an order of deportation which in turn is bottomed upon a deportation proceeding held in accordance with law. When Congress made use of the word "deported" in the statute, it meant "deported according to law." '14 The court thus held that a valid deportation order was required in order to convict an alien for unlawful reentry under section 1326.
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Gasca-Kraft,' 5 used language similar to that in Bowles: "A material element of the offense defined by [section] 1326 is a lawful deportation."' 6 The court made no mention, however, of an inquiry into an order's factual basis.' 7 In United States v. Rangel-Gonzales,", the court held that one ground for challenging a deportation order is the failure of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") to follow a regulation established for the benefit of the alien. In such a case, "the violation invalidates the deportation 'only if the violation prejudiced interests of the alien which were protected by the regulation.' "9
The Seventh Circuit also allows collateral attacks, but limits their scope more than the Third and Ninth Circuits. In United States v. Heikkinen, 20 the court held that a collateral attack was limited to determining whether the INS had afforded the defendant due process in the deportation hearing, and whether it had followed the pertinent regulations and statutes. 2 ' The court precluded a hearing de novo on the deportation order. 2 In contrast to these opinions, the Second Circuit seems to have precluded collateral attacks in most circumstances. of a felony conviction could not challenge the deportation order in a section 1326 prosecution on the grounds of a defect in his guilty plea. The court's decision was based on several factors. The first was the "arguable" congressional intent to preclude collateral attacks. 2 ' The second was the court's determination that allowing a collateral attack would place too great a burden on the prosecution: "The Government might still have been able in 1970 to prove the constitutional adequacy of Pereira's 1965 guilty plea; in 1978, the task is obviously more difficult. '25 The third factor was the defendant's failure to exhaust his administrative and judicial remedies prior to any of his several deportations. 26 In concluding, however, the court qualified its prohibition of collateral attacks: "Under these circumstances, we do not hesitate to affirm Pereira's conviction, without deciding whether, under other circumstances, a collateral attack on a deportation order might be permissible in a § 1326 proceeding. '27 None of these cases contained an adequate justification for its holding. Those allowing collateral attacks did so without sufficient consideration of the legislative history of section 1326 or of the structure of the immigration laws generally. Those prohibiting collateral attacks did not adequately consider whether due process may require that collateral attacks be allowed in some situations.
H. THE STATUTE AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
The argument often made against allowing collateral attacks is ' 574 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 847 (1978 Gonzalez-Parra, 438 F.2d 694 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1010 (1971 , held that all challenges to a deportation order must be made prior to deportation. The court reached its conclusion primarily through statutory construction. Id. at 697. The court also noted that the alien had waived an administrative remedy and had not filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the order prior to deportation. Id. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit, in Arriaga-Ramirez v. United States, 325 F.2d 857, 859 (10th Cir. 1963) , held that section 1326 "requires only that it be shown there was a previous 'deportation. "' that section 1326 punishes the alien solely for disobeying the deportation order, not for being deportable." In labelling an alien deportable, the INS does not punish him; rather, it issues an order on the basis of the finding of deportability. Section 1326 punishes him solely for disobeying that order. Under this view, the lawfulness of the order is irrelevant. An alien always is bound, as a result, to obtain permission before reentering.
The response to this argument is that it is not certain that section 1326 should punish the alien solely for disobeying the deportation order. It is necessary to inquire into the intent of Congress from the wording of the statute, its legislative history, and the statutory structure of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952.29
Section 1326 is silent on the necessity for a valid deportation before a prosecution can be brought for illegal reentry. The statute provides that an alien who reenters after being "arrested and deported" 3 0 commits a felony. The wording is ambiguous, because "deported" may refer either to the act of causing an alien to leave the United States, or to such an act only when it is carried out lawfully. One interpretation is that the absence of the words "lawfully deported" means that Congress intended any reentry after deportation to be a criminal offense. There are other statutes, for example, that are silent as to the need for a valid underlying deter- The deportation order was proper on its face. Defender [sic] had no right to reenter the country without seeking the permission of the Attorney General. The only question to be decided on this trial is whether there was an outstanding order of deportation pursuant to which the defendant was deported and whether thereafter he reentered the country without seeking permission of the Attorney General to reapply for admission. This "proper on its face" reasoning is used frequently in cases in which a deportee who unlawfully reenters is deported again. The main argument ... is ... that it is not the agency who imprisons the defendant, and his imprisonment does not flow directly and necessarily from the fact found by the agency. He is not imprisoned for not being a conscientious objector but for disobeying an order to report for duty. The draft board does not punish him, but classifies him and issues an order based on that classification, and it is for disobeying that order that he is punished. [48:83 mination or adjudication, in which collateral attacks have been denied. 31 Drawing such an inference of intent from the wording of the statute may be as speculative as concluding that Congress intended to allow collateral attacks, however. The absence of the phrase "lawfully deported" could have been an oversight, or Congress may never have considered the question. One could argue further that such ambiguous wording should be construed in favor of the defendant in accordance with the canon that criminal statutes should be interpreted narrowly.
32 Section 1326 thus may support two plausible but inconsistent interpretations.
The sparse legislative history of the statute gives no clear support for either interpretation, although its tone suggests that Congress would' have disapproved of collateral attacks had it considered them directly. A House committee report indicated that only the most cursory of judicial review was envisioned for determinations of deportability, emphasizing that "the decision of the Secretary of Labor in every case of deportation shall be final."" s Furthermore, the cosponsor of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 seemed hostile to granting deportees any advantages: "[I]t seems to be almost an impossibility for the agencies of the Government to deport [illegal aliens]. When the agencies undertake to deport aliens who are illegally in the United States, they are confronted with every kind of barrier and excuse. The structure of the Act also indicates that Congress intended to preclude collateral attacks. tion in that statute that collateral attacks should be denied is the provision that a court may not review a deportation order if the alien has left the United States. 37 The statute also provides that an alien must exhaust his administrative remedies before judicial review of the order is possible; he is given six months to do so. If an alien fails to appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, he loses the right to make a later challenge. 38 Section 1105a also specifically allows collateral attacks in two types of prosecutions: those for willful failure to comply with regulations of the Attorney General pending deportation, and those for failure to depart from the United States. 39 In contrast, there is no provision for collateral attacks in section 1326 prosecutions. This omission may have been intentional; Congress may have wanted to deny collateral attacks in section 1326 cases to give deportees no encouragement, however slight, to reenter the country by the prospect of avoiding prosecution if caught.
4 0 Also, a deportation order in a section 1326 prosecution is likely to be old, imposing serious proof problems on the Government. 4 '
HI. DUE PROCESS
Congressional intent alone, however, may not determine whether collateral attacks should be allowed in section 1326 prosecutions. Even if Congress intended that deportation orders be unreviewable, one must ask whether due process requires that the defendant alien be allowed to make a collateral attack in some circumstances.
There are exceptional cases in which collateral attacks should be allowed regardless of whether the alien was represented by counsel prior to deportation. If an alien was denied a hearing 37 Id. § 1105a(c).
Id. § 1105a(a)(1). 39 Id. § 1105a(a)(6) allows pretrial collateral attacks in prosecutions under id. § 1252(d) (willful failure to comply with regulations pending deportation after an order has been served), and id. § 1252(e) (willful failure to depart within six months after being served with an order of deportation).
40 See text and notes at notes 85-87 infra. As a further indication of a congressional policy of discouraging aliens from entering surreptitiously under any circumstances, 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1976) declares an alien entering the United States at an improper time or place guilty of a criminal offense. The collateral attack issue also has arisen in cases involving this statute, which enhances the punishment for repeated violations. The Ninth Circuit has allowed collateral attacks on the earlier conviction in trials in which the harsher penalty is sought. United States v. Lopez-Beltran, 607 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1979 .
41 See text and note at note 25 supra.
before expulsion, or was denied a needed interpreter or the right to appeal an adverse decision, there is little question that collateral attacks are proper. Precluding challenges in'such cases would allow the government to deport anyone it desired without due process and with impunity. The deportee would have no effective redress, because the agency that expelled him would be unlikely to readmit him. Allowing collateral attacks not only would permit the person unlawfully deported to reenter the country but also would nullify the effect of the government's misconduct. Such cases of egregious governmental insensitivity to notions of fundamental fairness presumably would be rare, however.
Cases not involving such exceptional circumstances can be divided into two types. The first type comprises section 1326 prosecutions in which the alien was represented by counsel at the deportation hearing; in such cases the alien, through his counsel, presumably knew what was happening and could respond intelligently to the proceedings. The second type involves prosecutions in which the alien was not represented by counsel at the hearing; there, it is much more likely that the alien was unaware of the legal complexities of his case and was less able to respond to them effectively.
A. Aliens Represented by Counsel at Deportation Hearings

1.
Yakus and Its Progeny. It can be argued that no due process issue is involved in a section 1326 trial when the defendant was represented by counsel at the deportation hearing, because due process requires only one opportunity to be heard. If the alien could have appealed the deportation order, but did not, or if he lost his appeal, he should lose the right to challenge the order at the later trial.
The rule against unlimited opportunities to be heard often is followed, and collateral attacks denied, in criminal trials for violations of administrative actions. The leading case, Yakus v. United States, 42 upheld convictions for the violation of a regulation promulgated under a wartime price control act. The statute required that challenges to a regulation be made in a special court within sixty days, after which time the regulation would become unreviewable. 43 The defendants failed to make a challenge, but at 42 321 U.S. 414 (1944) .
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trial they attempted to argue that the order was invalid.
The Court upheld the trial court's rejection of that defense, saying that by providing for an exclusive procedure to test the validity of regulations, Congress intended to eliminate the defense of their invalidity. 44 The Court approved the statute, saying that the opportunity for testing the regulation, though limited, satisfied the requirements of due process: " [W] e are pointed to no principle of law or 'provision of the Constitution which precludes Congress from maiAng criminal the violation of an administrative regulation, by one who has failed to avail himself of an adequate separate procedure for the adjudication of its validity . . ,, 45 The Court noted that "a constitutional right may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it."
46
Although the theory of Yakus may be sensible, an indiscriminate application of the doctrine would result in intolerable harshness and hardship in some cases. 47 The short time limit was the most objectionable feature, making it unlikely that the regulation would be reviewed within the set period. Furthermore, the statute assumed that a person had the incentive to challenge a regulation before violating it, an unreasonable assumption given the expense and inconvenience of going to court." In addition, there was a notice problem because of the difficulty of discovering the agency action before the time limit expired.
These criticisms are not persuasive, however, when the Yakus rationale is applied to section 1326 prosecutions. Gone are the most objectionable elements of Yakus: the short time limit, the sharply restricted procedures for making a challenge, the lack of incentive to challenge the agency's action, and the notice problem. An alien ordered deported has notice of the agency's action, and also knows that he is not welcome to return to the United States.
41 Id. Justice Rutledge sharply dissented from the holding that Congress could deny courts the authority to determine the validity of an administrative action underlying a criminal indictment. Id. at 478-85 (Rutledge, J., dissenting If he wants to reenter the country legally ever again, therefore, he has an incentive to appeal the order.
Furthermore, the alien may challenge the deportation order prior to leaving the country; if he has counsel, he has little excuse for not doing so. By regulation, he must be informed of his right to appeal, and is given a simple form to complete, on which he is asked to give brief reasons for his appeal. 4 ' He may move for reopening or reconsideration by the special inquiry officer if there is newly available material evidence. 5 0 In addition, he may appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals." If the Board denies the appeal, he may file a motion to reconsider. 5 2 Once the administrative remedies are exhausted, he has the right to seek judicial review of the deportation order, 53 or if he is in custody he may also fie a habeas corpus petition." Once outside the country he may seek reentry by applying for a visa at a consulate after getting permission to do so from the INS. 5 To allow aliens to ignore these procedures, reenter the country, and then challenge the deportation would tend to denigrate the remedies and procedures available to aliens and might well encourage aliens to avoid them.
None of the exceptions to the Yakus doctrine applies to section 1326 prosecutions. In McKart v. United States, 56 the Court allowed a challenge to a Selective Service classification in a criminal trial for refusal to submit to induction, despite the defendant's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. The opinion stated that the test for allowing a challenge was "whether there is. . . a governmental interest compelling enough to outweigh the severe burden" on the defendant. 5 7 The Court mentioned several factors to consider, including the impact on the defendant, 58 the need for an agency to discover and correct its own errors in order to avoid unnecessary litigation, 59 and the concern that "frequent and deliberate flouting of administrative processes could weaken the effectiveness of an agency by encouraging people to ignore its 
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procedures." 60
In the subsequent, similar draft-classification case of McGee v. United States, 6 1 the Court described more explicitly the situations in which collateral attacks are permissible in Selective Service cases. The opinion showed that the decision in McKart was not an invitation to unlimited collateral attacks. Holding that the defendant could not challenge his classification in a criminal trial, the Court said that when a purely factual dispute was involved, the exhaustion doctrine would be applied against the defendant. 6 2 If, however, the issue had been entirely legal, failure to exhaust would have been unimportant. 6 s The Court explained its use of the exhaustion doctrine by emphasizing the need to protect "the interest in full administrative fact gathering and utilization of agency expertise,"'" an interest that might be undermined if defendants "were allowed to press their claims in court despite a... failure to exhaust." ' 5 Section 1326 prosecutions present situations similar to that in McGee. The INS has the authority and duty to determine whether an alien should be deported. The inquiry is the largely factual one of whether the alien comes within the statutory grounds for deportation. By analogy to McGee, an alien, represented by counsel, who does not exhaust his remedies should not be allowed to challenge the deportation order in a section 1326 prosecution. The INS should be allowed to make its findings of fact and be given a chance to correct its own errors.
2. Escape and Recidivism. Collateral attacks also are disallowed in several analogous situations. One is where a prisoner tries to defend an escape prosecution by attacking the proceeding that resulted in his detention. 6 The prisoner's argument is that if his confinement was unlawful, then his escape was legal because he was regaining his unlawfully denied freedom.
The primary reason for denying a prisoner the right to make a collateral attack is that cited in Yakus and in several section 1326 cases: he has legal means to air his grievances. He has the right to appeal his conviction, and if appeals are denied he may file a habeas corpus petition. Other grievances may be taken through administrative channels. The courts' theory is that society has an interest-the maintenance of order and respect for the law-in encouraging prisoners to utilize the available avenues for relief, an interest that would be impaired by allowing a prisoner to employ a collateral attack defensively in an escape prosecution. The cases therefore are in agreement that a prisoner has no right to self-help as long as legal remedies are available. 7 Another situation in which collateral attacks generally are denied is recidivism cases in which the defendant has been represented by counsel at the earlier proceeding. 6 8 The statutes involved generally are of two types: those that enhance a penalty because of the defendant's criminal record, and those in which a prior conviction serves as the basis for criminalizing an otherwise lawful act. In cases of the first type, no collateral attacks are allowed when the underlying conviction is challenged as founded on insufficient evidence. The rationale is that challenges should have been made at that proceeding through appeals, rather than allowing the defendant to make them later and thereby burden the subsequent proceeding. If the conviction is challenged on grounds of a constitutional violation (other than denial of counsel), there is uncertainty as to the purposes for which the conviction may be used, such as whether it may be used for impeachment of testimony or for actual enhancement of punishment., 9 Frequently litigated examples of the second type of recidivism case, involving a prior conviction that makes otherwise lawful action criminal, are the federal statutes prohibiting convicted felons from possessing firearms and lying about their past convictions when purchasing a weapon. 7 0 If a defendant's earlier conviction is outstanding at the weapons offense trial, no collateral attacks are allowed. Most courts also have held that, if the defendant was in the "convicted" status when he possessed the weapon, he may be prosecuted even if after arrest but before trial the underlying conviction has been overturned. Generally, courts have based their decisions on statutory construction: "Congress did not intend to exempt. . . one whose status as a convicted felon changed after the date of possession, regardless of how that change of status occurred .... [The statute] speaks only of conviction of a felony. It contains no requirement that the conviction be finally upheld on appeal. ' 7 2 As with deportation, 7 3 some courts have cited the need for judicial efficiency as a reason for opposing collateral attacks, saying that they would be an encumbrance in trials based on facially valid convictions."
The reasoning in the firearms cases may be applied to section 1326 prosecutions in which the defendant was represented by counsel at the deportation hearing. Just as a convicted felon may apply for a permit before buying a gun, so may a deported alien apply for readmission before reentering. In the case of a weapons violation, a convicted felon whose appeals are unsuccessful and 
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who cannot obtain a permit must refrain from possessing a gun. By analogy, represented aliens ordered deported whose appeals were fruitless or who failed to appeal, and who are denied permission to reenter, should not be able to come into the country. This is especially true, arguably, because aliens have no legally recognized right to enter the United States." 6 3. Further Considerations. There are additional reasons for not allowing represented aliens to make collateral attacks. Of considerable importance is the danger that allowing the reopening of all deportation orders would result in uncertainty in immigration law. " [T] here must be an end to litigation and thus, to uncertainty, so that officials and other persons may perform their duties and conduct their lives on the basis of reasonably firm principles and premises.
7
The need to have efficient and workable judicial and administrative systems also is important. Side-trials of deportation orders would produce delays in the proceedings and increased burdens on the INS 78 and the court system. There often would be an immense evidentiary burden on the Government, especially if many years had elapsed between the deportation and the section 1326 prosecution . 7 The immigration judge might be retired or dead, and witnesses may have become unavailable. Memories may fade, or records may be lost or inconclusive from poor record keeping or because the standard of proof of deportability has been changed in the interim." 0 Even if the alien had to establish a prima facie case, the Government might be unable to rebut it.
Another possible concern is that allowing collateral attacks might have a negative effect on the federal policy of excluding those aliens not accepted for entry into the United States. The immigration laws encourage aliens to respect this policy in several ways: aliens are required to enter the country at ports of entry and to be subject to inspection; 81 unlawful entry is made both a deportable 8s and a criminal offense; 8s and unlawful reentry after deportation is made a more serious offense in order to deter habitual illegal entrants."
It has been argued that allowing collateral attacks on deportation orders frustrates this policy by weakening one of the few deterrents to illegal entry. There are few effective deterrents: if no one knows that an alien has entered, no one is looking for him, so his chances of being caught are slim. The argument is that some habitual illegal entrants will consider that it is worthwhile to reenter the country, given the slight chance of being caught and the opportunity to avoid prosecution by making a collateral attack. 85 This argument sometimes is used in escape cases as a reason for denying collateral attacks: prisoners convinced of their innocence might believe that there was little to lose by escaping (because, if they are correct, they will be freed), thus resulting in more escapes 88 Such an argument is largely fanciful. The chances of an alien knowing of this point of constructional law are minute. Those few who do know would be unlikely to rely on it, because making a Even though the present risk of prosecution for illegal entry would remain under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1326, a defendant would have an added incentive to enter again and again, knowing that a trial de novo on the issue of alienage would be forthcoming and that such a trial might, on one occasion, result in a favorable verdict .... [A] ccomplishment of the objectives of the immigration laws to discourage and effectively control the already difficult problem of illegal entries into this country would thus be weakened. the criminal sanction is sufficient to ensure that the great majority ...will exhaust all administrative remedies .... The arguments concerning due process and the need for administrative and judicial efficiency, on the other hand, are so strong that the reasons in support of collateral attacks seem unpersuasive in cases where the alien was represented by counsel. An alien who had counsel and who appealed through the agency and through the courts but lost simply should not be able to reenter the country without permission.
B. Aliens Unrepresented by Counsel at Deportation Hearings
In section 1326 prosecutions in which the alien had no counsel at the deportation hearing,s the arguments against collateral attacks are less persuasive. An alien unfamiliar with the language, customs, laws, and regulations of the United States is at an obvious disadvantage when compared with aliens represented by counsel. 89 Such an alien cannot reasonably be expected to understand 8 Compare the Supreme Court's statement of the value of a lawyer in a criminal triah The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the the legal complexities of the deportation proceeding, and may waive an appeal without realizing the implications of doing so. He is also at a disadvantage in presenting evidence, cross-examining witnesses, and giving reasons for an appeal. Furthermore, although an alien may provide his own attorney, "the right to counsel is a meaningless one . . . [if] people are too poor to hire their own advocates." 9 0 Although deportation long has been labelled a civil proceeding, 91 even the Supreme Court has recognized that functionally it is equivalent to a criminal proceeding. "[Deportation] may result... in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) The order of deportation is not a punishment for crime.... It is but a method of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien who has not complied with the conditions upon the performance of which the government of the nation, acting within its constitutional authority .... has determined that his continuing to reside here shall depend. He has not, therefore, been deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law .... As a consequence of this doctrine, various rules of evidence and procedure that apply to criminal proceedings have been held not to apply to deportation hearings. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) living." ' 2 The equivalence of deportation proceedings to criminal trials is important because of the accepted doctrine that uncounseled convictions may not be used to support guilt or enhance punishment. 9 3 By analogy, therefore, a deportation order that was the product of an uncounseled hearing should be challengeable, at least in some situations, in section 1326 prosecutions.
The federal courts are practically unanimous in their acceptance" of the rule that felony convictions obtained without the defendant having had the benefit of counsel may not be used "either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense." 9 5 Although the early cases contained little discussion of why uncounseled felony convictions should be void for enhancement of punishment purposes, later cases have held that "the subsequent conviction or sentence violated the Sixth Amendment because it depended upon the reliability of a past uncounseled conviction." 6 It may be argued that a denial of counsel similarly renders deportation proceedings so unreliable as to be void, in some instances, for section 1326 purposes. Even though a deportation hearing in which the alien has no counsel may not be invalid per se I ' Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) . Accord, Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522, 530-31 (1954); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) . See generally Comment, supra note 91.
The Court has questioned its labelling of deportation as civil. E.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 98 (1958) (plurality opinion of Warren, C.J.); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) . Perhaps because of these doubts, courts have limited the power of the federal government to determine the conditions under which aliens may remain in or be expelled from the United States. The United States has authority to exclude all aliens, see note 76 supra, but the government has no resultant lawful power to deny all rights to aliens within the country, see, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (federal statute providing that certain aliens illegally within the country could be sentenced to term of hard labor by executive officer without trial held unconstitutional). Decisions have established minimum standards for deportation, holding that fundamental principles of justice must be respected, and that proceedings must be fair. E.g., Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 457-58, 464 (1920) . Fairness includes such requirements as notice of the charges and of the hearing, the right to examine witnesses, and the right to be represented by counsel at no expense to the government. See Whetstone v. INS, 561 F.2d 1303 , 1306 (9th Cir. 1977 Yiannopoulos v. Robinson, 247 F.2d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 1957 as a denial of due process, because of the longstanding doctrine that deportation is a civil proceeding, a hearing might be held invalid when violation of the order was the basis of a criminal prosecution.
A response to this claim of unfairness in deportation hearings without counsel is that the regulations and case law attempt to minimize the hardship of the absence of counsel. The INS is required to provide an interpreter for an alien who needs one; 97 courts have recognized that "[t]he right to a hearing is a vain thing if the alien is not understood." 98 The alien at least can understand what is being said, and he is able to respond to questions. The regulations require that the alien be advised of his right to be represented by counsel of his own choosing at his expense. 99 He must be told that he will have an opportunity to examine and object to evidence against him, to present evidence on his behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses. The factual allegations must be read to him and the charges explained in "nontechnical language." 100 Once the deportation order is entered, the alien is provided with a simple form that asks whether he seeks to appeal and, if so, asks for brief reasons why. 10 1 Nevertheless, such procedures are not equivalent to providing counsel; in criminal trials, for example, a judge's attempts to protect the defendant, no matter how careful, do not render the presence of counsel unnecessary.
This comment does not suggest that the courts should require the government to provide counsel for aliens at deportation hearings. Although deportation is functionally equivalent to criminal punishment, the long standing of the doctrine that it is a civil matter makes a change of designation unlikely. Rather, it is suggested that in a section 1326 prosecution, the judge should allow collateral attacks on a case-by-case basis by aliens unrepresented by counsel.
10 2 Aliens who were unrepresented by counsel at the hearing 455 (1942) . In that case, which concerned whether states were required to provide counsel in criminal cases, the Court held that there was no per se invalidity to a counselless conviction; rather, denial [of counsel] is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case. That which may, on one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations, fall short of such denial.
[48:83 could attack the deportation order, but would succeed only upon a showing of substantial procedural impropriety or a denial of fundamental fairness at the deportation hearing. 1 03 Such a theory would prevent collateral attacks in which the alien had counsel, and would not present any significant encouragement to aliens to reenter the country: few aliens who could afford a lawyer would intentionally forgo using one in order to be free to make a collateral attack at a later trial for illegal reentry. Equally few unrepresented aliens would know of this obscure point of constructional law. When the alien was unrepresented, the Yakus argument that due process requires only one opportunity to be heard' 04 is of considerably less force than when the alien was represented. If the alien had no counsel, there is a serious question as to whether there was an adequate opportunity to be heard. There also is doubt whether a failure to exhaust his remedies was a considered decision. An alien without a lawyer is at an obvious disadvantage compared to an alien with a lawyer in presenting his case.1
05
Id. at 462 (footnote omitted).
Although Betts has been overruled with respect to criminal trials, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963), its test suits the unusual case of collateral attacks on deportation orders. There, as in criminal trials under Betts, the government need not provide the defendant with counsel in deportation proceedings, but a challenge to the proceedings will be allowed when exceptional circumstances exist.
103 Examples would be the denial of the right to present evidence, or to cross-examine witnesses, or to have counsel at his expense. See note 92 supra.
Admittedly, this theory will produce some of the undesirable burdens on the courts mentioned in text and notes at notes 77-80 supra. This is inevitable in any system that allows collateral attacks, because many aliens will claim that there was a gross miscarriage of justice at the deportation hearing even if there was a fair proceeding. The relatively high standard of proof required to prevail should reduce the numbers who will mount an attack, however, and the delays to the trial will be reduced if the judge, rather than the jury, decides whether the collateral attack has merit.
I" See text and notes at notes 42-46 supra. 1o5 The case of Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980), is distinguishable and does not cast doubt on the validity of the cases concerning counselless convictions. The Court in Lewis held that a person whose underlying conviction was obtained without counsel in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), nevertheless could be prosecuted for possession of a weapon under 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1) (1976) discussed in text and notes at notes 70-76 supra. The Court said that, unlike the cases in which a counselless conviction was held void, the reliability of the conviction under the firearms statute was unimportant. 445 U.S. at 67. The intent of Congress, the Court determined, was to prohibit anyone convicted of a felony from possessing a gun, regardless of whether that conviction was valid; the Court noted that the statute prohibits weapons possession by anyone under indictment, even if that person is later exonerated. Id. at 64.
Saying that it had "never suggested that an uncounseled conviction is invalid for all purposes," id. at 66-67, the Court approved as "rational" the congressional judgment that "a convicted felon, even one whose conviction was allegedly uncounseled, is among the class of and actual prejudice resulting from the constitutional violation that is the basis of his petition.
This rationale should apply to an alien, unrepresented at the deportation hearing, who is on trial in a section 1326 prosecution. An alien unrepresented by counsel often will have a good reason for not exhausting his remedies: in the absence of counsel, he may fail to understand the implications of his decision not to appeal. 2 Furthermore, the technical failure to exhaust remedies is not the reason the defendant is prosecuted under section 1326; rather, the faults of the deportation hearing are what caused the deportation order to be issued, and thus the alien should be allowed to expose those faults by means of a collateral attack.
CONCLUSION
The courts are divided over the availability of collateral attacks on deportation orders in section 1326 prosecutions. Although the statute is silent as to the need for a valid deportation, the legislative history and the structure of the immigration laws suggest that allowing collateral attacks is inconsistent with congressional intent.
Furthermore, there is no compelling reason to allow an alien represented by counsel at the deportation hearing to make a collateral attack. If he appealed the finding of deportability but lost, he should not be able to reenter the country without permission. If he failed to appeal, he may be presumed to have done so knowingly and intelligently; he should not be allowed to reenter even if it appears that the deportation order was improper.
In cases in which the alien was unrepresented by counsel, however, there may be serious doubt about whether he was able to participate intelligently in the deportation hearing. Therefore, the alien should be allowed to mount a successful collateral attack if he can show a denial of fundamental fairness or a substantial procedural impropriety at the hearing.
Thomas B. Haynes
" See text and notes at notes 89-90 supra.
